时 间：2020年12月16日（星期三）下午2:30
地 点：腾讯会议（ID：390 665 436）
题 目：The Reversed Pay Gap of CSOEs
报告人：阴慧芳 教授（上海财经大学会计学院）
主讲嘉宾简介：
阴慧芳，上海财经大学会计学院教授，博士生导师。入选上海市教委“晨光学者”计划，论文发表于Journal of Accounting and Economics、Journal of Accounting Research、Review of Accounting Studies以及Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance等国际知名期刊。
内容摘要：
The tournament theory (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981) predicts that pay gap within organization creates incentives for agents to elicit efforts and thus enhance organization performance. However, a reversed pay gap might exists in Central government owned enterprises (CSOEs). That is, the executive pay of subsidiary firm is greater than that of parent firm. Leveraging on the 2015 CSOE pay reform, we examine the determinants and consequences of such reversed pay gap. We find that a reversed pay gap is more likely to be observed when CSOEs are less authoritarian, face more competitive market competition, have more open-minded leader and have less social connections between superiors and subordinates. We further document that a reversed pay gap is positively associated with subsidiary firm’s accounting performance and negatively associated with their misconduct behavior. Collectively, we document a novel incentive scheme within CSOEs.
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会计学系、会计研究中心
2020年12月14日
