讲座题目：Who Will Board a Sinking Ship? A Firm-director Interdependence Perspective of Mutual Selection Between Declining Firms and Director Candidates

主 讲 人：美国德克萨斯大学--达拉斯分校 夏军 教授

讲座时间：2022年5月24日（周二）上午8：30

腾讯会议：841 444 670

主讲人简介:

夏军教授，美国德克萨斯大学--达拉斯分校Jindal9778818威尼斯战略管理学教授，主要研究领域包括组织理论、公司战略、社会网络、国际商务等。已在Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Organization Science, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies和Organizational Research Methods等专业期刊上发表30余篇高水平学术文章。

讲座摘要:

We develop a firm–director interdependence perspective to theorize director appointments as the outcome of a mutual selection process in which firms and director candidates select each other based on their organizational and personal dependencies. We apply this perspective to address a puzzle regarding director appointment in declining firms: Declining firms are often motivated to bring in director candidates with high resource endowments to help enact turnarounds, but these candidates may not join a declining firm’s board due to the potential uncertainties and reputational loss of doing so. Drawing on the firm–director interdependence perspective, we predict that director candidates’ social capital and human capital have inverted U-shaped effects on their likelihood of joining a declining firm. Moreover, the declining firm’s organizational social capital differently moderates the effects of candidates’ social capital and human capital. Evidence from a sample of public firms under special treatment (*ST) in China supports our theoretical predictions.